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ABSTRACT 
Cloud computing service providers offer computing resource as a 
utility and software as a service over network. Many believe that 
Cloud computing is making an industry-wise paradigm shift for 
IT use. Besides its technique issues, the business feature of Cloud 
computing attracts our interests. Specifically the practice of 
Amazon EC2 introduces an interesting pricing scheme. Amazon 
provides users with virtual computing instances as a combination 
of interruptible service (i.e., spot instance) and uninterruptible 
service (i.e., on-demand and reserved instance). Spot instance is 
charged at a per use price which is dynamically changing over 
time; users of spot instance face the risk of service termination on 
the provider’s side. In this paper, we build a multiple-stage game 
to study users’ best job submission strategy under such a mixed 
pricing scheme, and to analyze the potential benefits and influence 
of such pricing scheme. We identify user-segments that will take 
different job submission strategies, and show that users should 
reserve resource for future high-value job arrivals. We also 
conduct numerical investigations to demonstrate how the outcome 
and best strategy vary according to the external market conditions. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.1.0 [Models and Principles]: General 
General Terms 
Economics 
Keywords 
Cloud Computing, Pricing model, Multi-stage Game 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Cloud Computing has attracted great interests from both the 
industry and academy in the past one decade. It offers a paradigm 
shift towards computing served as a utility and software accessed 
as a service over the network. Importantly, Cloud Computing 
should not be only considered as a technical innovation itself. 
Sharing computer resources in Grid computing, virtualization and 
on demand services such as Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) has 
been there before Cloud Computing appeared. The real revolution 
of Cloud is the combination of those different IT aspects into a 
new business model that shifts the traditional way of IT 
provisioning.  
Practitioners, both firms who are in need of IT resources and 
providers who offer IT capacity are trying to understand this new 
business model and figure out how to benefit from it. Although 
usage-based pricing model is adopted by most providers, there are 
different versions of it in practice. For example, Salesforce.com1, 
probably the most successful Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) 
provider so far, charges a monthly subscription fee to its users for 
accessing its online CRM software applications. Amazon Elastic 
Computing Cloud (EC2)2, the leading Infrastructure-as-a-Service 
(IaaS) provider, charges users by hour. Cloud Sigma 3 , an 
emerging IaaS provider from Switzerland, also charges customers 
by hour, but its billing segment is as short as 5 minutes. The focus 
of our study is the pricing model for Cloud service providers. 
Specifically, we identify the possibility of simultaneously using 
multiple pricing methods for better resource utilization, and study 
how it could potentially benefit both the provider and/or users.  
Amazon EC2 is a well-established cloud computing service. 
There are three types of EC2 instances. On-demand computing 
instance was first introduced in 2006. After that, reserved instance 
was introduced in early 2009, and spot instance in late 2009 [1]. A 
spot instance is charged at a “spot price.” To use a spot instance, a 
user must submit a bid price; Amazon collects all the requests and 
bids from users, and decide the “spot price”. A spot price 
therefore is set based on the relationship of supply and demand 
dynamically over time. The price history over the past 90 days is 
publically available on the Amazon website, which helps a new 
user to estimate the cost of spot instance and to submit an 
appropriate bid. A very interesting and unique feature of spot 
instance, other than its dynamic price, is its service interrupt-
ability.  The right of service termination is in the hands of the 
provider. For example, at time t, if a user’s bid price exceeds the 
spot price, the user’s requested spot instance would be launched. 
However, at time t+1, if the spot price increases while that 
instance is still running, Amazon will terminate it. This instance 
fails to execute. It is no doubt that users of spot instance face 
uncertainty risk of service-being-terminated. The “expected” 
quality of spot instance therefore is lower than that of on-demand 
or reserved instance, since the latter two instances both have 
                                                                
1  It charges US$65/per user/month for it professional complete CRM 
applications for any size team. Please refer to 
http://www.salesforce.com/ap/crm/editions-pricing.jsp for more tiered 
pricing schemes.  
2 Amazon EC2 charges $0.08 per hour for standard small instance in us-
east-1 region. More price information is available at 
http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/pricing/. 
3 CloudSigma charges $0.0106 per hour for CPU power and updates price 
every 5 minutes. Please refer to 
http://www.cloudsigma.com/en/pricing/price-schedules for more 
information. 
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guaranteed services without interruption after paying the 
respective price.  Both on-demand and reserved instances give full 
control to customers and are of the same quality. Reserved 
instances are cheaper because it requires users pay a certain 
amount of upfront fee to reserve the capacity [2]. It requires 
customers to anticipate and schedule their task executions given 
their past experience with their own IT demand. Spot instance is 
the cheapest among the three. Risk seeking users might run all 
their jobs on spot instance to pursue minimum cost on computing 
service. However they have to take the risk of losing services 
unexpectedly. 
The introduction of spot instance is consistent with some previous 
studies. Bhargava and Choudhary [4] stated that it’s optimal for a 
software vendor to offer lower-quality product when the variable 
cost is low. Customers’ perceived quality of spot instance is lower 
because it could be terminated unwillingly by the provider. In 
addition, Etzion [5] showed that an optimal design of dual selling 
channel, auction and fix price selling, could outperform pure 
selling in most circumstances.  
Like traditional IT service providers, Cloud computing service 
providers must strategically manage the peak load capacity and 
overall utilization level of their infrastructure. The infrastructure 
of a Cloud service provider typically is not fully utilized in most 
of the time [7]. In addition, due to the advance in virtualization 
technology and emergence of Internet based delivery model, there 
is no need to physically transfer facilities from one place to 
another in order to fulfill requirements of globally distributed 
customers. Thus the cost of reallocating resources is negligible for 
Cloud computing services. Cloud vendor is able to and should 
pull the IT demand together from the whole market so that they 
could better manage resources and handle demand volatility. The 
use of spot instance illustrates that Amazon’s practice of 
encouraging customers to use their spare computing resource that 
is not occupied by reserved and on-demand instances. 
In the real world, thousands of instances are simultaneously 
running in the Cloud. A naive yet reasonable way to group the 
various instances is to divide them into two types: important high 
value jobs and low value jobs. To serious business users, high 
value tasks are those keep their core business functionality 
running with a reasonable high performance. Low value tasks are 
those help to enhance user’s experience in terms of response time, 
resolution level, and so on. A profit maximizing business user will 
find Amazon EC2 especially attractive as it provides two types of 
instances that fit the two types of jobs. Given the very low cost of 
spot instance, a risk seeking customer might put its jobs on spot to 
enjoy the great cost reduction but bears the risk of service 
interruption. There are some real world examples that users 
submit almost all its jobs to spot instance. SEOMOZ, a Cloud-
based SEO software vendor, runs most of their services on 
Amazon spot instance before September 2011. A spot price spike 
happened during September 2011. Amazon terminated all their 
spot instances. It took SEOMOZ two weeks to fully recover the 
services [10]. After the accident SEOMOZ changed to a mix 
strategy that uses both on-demand instance and spot instance. 
From the accident of SEOMOZ, we see an effort of current Cloud 
computing customers to adapt to the offered service category and 
pricing model. The concept of spot instance is fresh in the context 
of computing service. In the past, the privilege of job termination 
was always in a customer’s hand. In spot instance, it is shifted to 
the service provider’s hand. Although spot instance customers are 
facing a lower unit price, the loss from service termination could 
be much higher than the cost reduction, as indicated in the 
SEOMOZ example. Cost reduction cannot always efficiently 
leverage the risk. In such cases customer who rely their business 
on spot service should employ a mixture usage of quality 
guaranteed service and spot service to lower the average risk to an 
acceptable level. 
There are studies that proposed solutions for utilizing spot service 
efficiently through strategic bidding [14]; and studies that 
introduced option mechanism to the spot service market [8]. In 
this study we take a different research angle. We are interested in 
the marketplace with one Cloud service provider and many 
customers in need of IT resources. Customers have anticipated IT 
demand and they use the mixture of reserved service and spot 
service to leverage risk. Knowing the strategic behavior of 
customers, the Cloud service provider tries to set prices, for both 
reserve instance price (which is fixed) and spot instance price 
(which is dynamically adjusted over time), in order to (1) 
maximize profit and (2) manage its IT resources effectively. 
Many previous works have analyzed and compared the selling 
model with a fixed fee and renting model with a pay-by-usage 
pricing [6;11;12]. Their major findings indicated that the fixed fee 
scheme could add value to the usage based pricing or sometimes 
outperform the usage based pricing in a competitive setting. 
Similar to these works, we also look at a monopolistic service 
provider who adopts two pricing schemes simultaneously. But 
different from these pervious works, we not only consider 
different pricing schemes, but also differentiated services. In 
addition, in our setting, customers face jobs with different nature. 
This study contributes to the Cloud computing literature in that it 
analyzes the mixed adoption model in the Cloud industry. It helps 
shed lights on resource / capacity management for Cloud service 
providers. It is also the first work, to our best knowledge, to study 
interruptible service in a business context. 
2. THE MODEL 
In the market, there are many risk neutral customers and a 
monopoly Cloud service provider. The provider offers two types 
of services, reserved service and spot service, simultaneously. 
Reserved service is charged at a fixed fee with an upper limit in 
usage amount, and spot service is charged by a unit price that is 
dynamically adjusted over time.  
We model it as a multi-stage game. There are k stages in the 
timeline. Customers must make a purchase decision of reserved 
service at the first stage. When a job arrives, customer will submit 
to the Cloud provider, either as a reserved instance, if this 
customer purchased reserved service at the first stage, or as a spot 
instance. For analytical convenience, we assume that customers 
only submit jobs at the beginning of each stage. The job arrival 
for customer i’s during one stage follows a Poisson distribution, 
arrival rate at λi We assume for one customer faces the same 
arrival rate in all stages and the job arrival process  in all stages 
are i.i.d. But different customers will face different λ , reflecting 
the nature difference in customers’ IT demand. There are two 
types of jobs, high value VH and low value VL. The proportion of 
high value jobs is a. This proportion keeps invariant for all 
customers. At the beginning of each stage, a customer must 
choose to submit its job arrivals to reserved service or spot 
service. Note that the price of using reserved service has been 
fixed at the first stage but there is an upper limit of amount a 
customer could use, while the price of spot instance is varying 
each period and the customer might be forced to terminate the job 
if the spot price rises in the next stage.  
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Reserved service is charged at a fixed price T with N units of 
instance hours. Spot price fluctuates randomly with a mean of ps 
which are known by all customers. We make such an assumption 
based on the following observations. In the website of Amazon 
EC2 service, the past 90-days spot price history is offered as the 
public information. Knowledge of how the spot prices change 
over time, such as its mean, volatility level, and varying pattern is 
available to potential customers. Moreover, Ben-Yehuda, et. al. [3] 
pointed out that spot price is randomly set within certain 
boundaries. Richard, et. al. [9] tested the time interval between 
two successive price change events in an 80 days price trace of 
standard small Linux spot instance, and his result showed price 
actually is changing randomly.  
Furthermore, we assume the probability of an interruption (for 
spot instance) is a random variable with mean pt. Jobs that are 
submitted to spot service and finally interrupted will not be 
resubmitted again. So there would be loss of utility for customers 
in the case of service interruption. We assume, at stage t, spot 
price is pst and the probability of service interruption is ptt. Both 
are exogenous given and known to customers at the beginning of 
stage t. But customers don’t know the future spot price (at stage 
t+1), nor the future service interruption probability.   
Table 1. Variable definition 
Variable Definition 
Nit 
Reserved service instance hours left at the 
beginning of stage t 
λi Job arrival rate of customer i in each stage 
Rit 
Number of jobs submitted to reserved service in 
stage t 
Sit Number of jobs submitted to spot service in stage t 
SSit 
Number of jobs that are submitted to spot service 
in period t and successfully finish without service 
interruption 
 
The Cloud provider’s decision variables are T and N, the reserved 
instance parameters. They must be determined at the first stage 
and keep invariant over time. For customers, at stage one, they 
have to decide whether or not to purchase the reserved service 
given (T, N). At the consecutive stage i (i>1), they have to decide 
how many jobs to submit to reserved instance if they purchased 
the reserved service at the first stage, and how many to submit to 
the spot instance.   
3. ANALYSIS 
We assume the value of high-value job, VH, is high enough that in 
case of      , the cost reduction in using spot service cannot 
offset a customer’s utility loss when a high-value job, submitted 
to spot service, is interrupted. That is to say            . Thus 
the more VH jobs a user potentially has, the more demanding the 
user is for reserved service. Denote V0=aVH+(1-a)VL, which 
measure the average job value, and             . This 
assumption indicates customers with N or more than N jobs will 
be better off using reserved service compared to using spot service. 
The reason is that if a customer has N jobs, he can execute all jobs 
on reserved service and get net utility      . But the net utility 
becomes                              if he uses 
spot service instead, which is lower. The utility difference is             . When a customer has more than N jobs, he 
should submit all VH jobs and some VL jobs to reserved service, in 
which case the average utility of jobs executed on reserved service 
is higher than V0. So it suggests that customers still get higher net 
utility using reserved service, and the utility difference could be 
even larger. Therefore the conclusion that customers with N or 
more than N jobs is better off using reserved service than using 
spot service follows.  
Customers vary in demands in terms of the number of jobs. So 
they face different job arrival rates. In what follows, we identify 
customers who will purchase reserved service. Customer i expects 
to have kλi jobs in total the whole process of k stages. If he has 
purchased the reserved service, his expected utility is calculated as 
follows:                                             
Extending this expression, we get: 
                                         
   
                 
When a Poisson distribution has a relative big arrival rate λ, we 
can use a Normal distribution with mean λ and variance λ as 
approximation of the Poisson distribution. When λ is greater than 
20, it is sufficient for such approximation. Thus we can use the 
below formula to calculate E(Ui).                      
It is easy to observe that E(Ui) increases with λ. The customer 
who is indifferent regarding purchase reserved service or not has a 
job arrival rate λ0 that makes          . 
The more jobs a customer has, the more likely he is going to 
purchase the reserved service. Intuitively, when the total number 
of jobs is close or exceeds the reserve service upper limits N, the 
user will submit more VH jobs running on reserved instance. Thus 
the average utility he gets from utilizing one unit of reserved 
service increases.  
We next identify customers that will use a mixture of reserved 
service and spot service. The “first” customer in this group should 
be the one whose jobs all run on reserved service and expected 
utility is maximized given the default N reserved instance hours.  
In order to find this specific user, indicated by the arrival rate λ*, 
we have to solve the maximization problem as below. 
                                                          
Here       stands for the virtual unit price of reserved instance. 
Solve the maximization problem we can get N* for any specific 
customer with demand represented by job arrive rate kλ over k 
stages. 
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For every λ there is an N*, and N* increases in λ.  λ* is the one that 
makes N*=N. Customers whose λ are greater than λ* will use both 
reserved service and spot service. They can actually execute a 
greater ratio of VH jobs on reserved instance and get higher utility 
than V0 per instance hour. Customers who purchased reserved 
service and has arrival rate λ<λ* will execute all jobs on reserved 
service. 
We assume the N reserved instance hours can cover all VH jobs for 
any individual customer. That is to say, the customer whose λ is 
the max is able to execute all its VH jobs on reserved service, i.e. 
aλ≤N. However in reality customer can have more than    jobs. In 
such a case, a customer will divide its jobs into multiple groups, 
each group satisfying the condition aλ≤N. Then we can derive the 
largest λ that represents the customer using reserved service to 
execute VH jobs only. We still can apply the utility maximization 
rule and derive the max arrival rate denoted as   . It should satisfy 
the condition:                   
Here we use a numerical example to illustrate how to calculate λ0 
and λ*. Consider there is only one stage, k=1. Model parameters 
are as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Parameter values of numerical illustration  
(for the calculation of λ0 and λ*) 
Variable T N VH VL 
Value 69 200 0.8 0.4 
 
These values are set subject to the constraint:                
When we change the proportion of high-value jobs in the total job 
arrivals, a, the results are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Results of numerical illustration of λ0 and λ* 
A 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.32 
λ0 144 139 133 131 
λ* 208 207 206 206    990 792 660 618 
σ1(λ*- λ0) 64 68 73 75 
σ2(   λ*) 782 585 454 412 
 
The numerical examples show that when a increases, λ0 decreases, 
λ* slightly decreases, and    decreases a lot. The interval between 
λ0 and λ* increases while the interval between λ* and    decreases. 
The larger a is, the more customers will purchase the reserved 
service, and among them the more customers will use a 
combination of reserved service and spot service.  
Lemma 1 identifies some behavior of a customer after he 
purchased reserved instance.  
Lemma 1. A customer, after purchasing reserved instance, will 
submit VH jobs to reserved instance so long as there is resource 
remain unused. 
[Proof] If a high value job arrives and the customer doesn’t 
submit it to reserved instance, there could be three possible 
outcomes.  
(1). This customer runs out of reserved resource at some 
stage afterwards.  
(2). At the last kth stage, remained reserved resources are 
just enough to satisfy all VH jobs arrived in that stage. 
(3). At the last kth stage, after submitting all VH jobs to 
reserved service, there is still some reserved resource 
left.  
In cases (1) and (2) there is no extra cost. In case (3) this customer 
bears some efficiency loss. In this case the best he can do is to 
submit VL jobs to reserved instances. While in this case, if he 
submits the VH task to reserved service at the current stage the 
overall utility will be higher. Because submitting VH
 
to spot 
instances will cause higher loss if the instance is interrupted. 
Therefore in this case customer will be better off by submitting 
current VH
 
job to reserved service. 
To summary, submitting current high value task to reserved 
service is always no worse than not submitting. Therefore the 
customer should submit high value tasks to reserved service as 
long as there are available resource.   Q.E.D. 
Thus in each stage, a customer submits all VH jobs, possibly some 
VL jobs too, to reserved service instantly. Never submitting VL 
jobs to reserved service is not optimal. The reason is that in the 
last kth stage, after submitting all jobs to reserved service, there is 
positive probability that there is still some reserved resource 
unused. The waste can be avoided if in current stage customer 
submits sufficient jobs, including VL jobs, to reserved service. But 
customer should do this with care, as a rash decision could cause 
running out of reserved resource before submitting all VH jobs in 
the last stage. Let’s denote the number of low value jobs 
submitted to reserved service by x. 
Lemma 2. When            , customers tend to submit low-value 
jobs to reserved service only if they are in later stage of the game.  
Prove: If a customer submits a VL job to reserved service and later 
on he finds there is no enough resource for VH jobs, the potential 
loss of utility is ps+(1-pt)VH. When the customer doesn’t submit a 
VL job to reserved service and in the end there is resources unused, 
the potential loss in utility is ps+ (1-pt)VL. Since VH>VL, among the 
two cases delaying the submission of low value jobs to reserved 
service is preferred because it causes less potential loss in utility.  
However the discussion above assumes that the two probabilities 
are equal, i.e. the possibility that reserved service is going to run 
out, and the possibility that reserved service is going to be wasted.  
In order to maximize his utility, a customer should keep              units of reserved instance hours for future use.  4  
When            , the probability of resources shortage           
                                                                
4
 Recall that F(x) is the cumulative density function of a normally 
distributed random variable with both mean and variance equal to the 
customer’s aggregated job arrival rate in future stages. 
266
is larger than that of over-provision        . Therefore, in this 
situation, instead of submitting all jobs to reserved service, they 
will use reserved service to execute all high value jobs and delay 
submitting low value jobs to reserved service.  
Q.E.D. 
At any stage t, customer i
 
got nit jobs. Denoting the number of VH 
jobs by Hit and the number of VL jobs by Lit. The customer will 
submit min(Hit, Nit) high value jobs to reserved service. Besides, 
he will submit xit low value jobs to reserved service, 0≤xit≤min(max(0, Nit-Hit), Lit). In total, he submits Rit=min(Hit, 
Nit)+xit jobs to reserved instance. In addition, Sit jobs are 
submitted to spot service. Note that Rit might be smaller than Hit 
and it could include both VH and VL jobs.  
We can use a list <Nit, nit, Rit, Sit, SSit> to represent customer i’s 
status and decision in stage t. They satisfy: 
Rit+Sit=nit 
Nit+1=Nit-Rit=Nit-anit-xit (SSit≤Sit) 
xit∈(0, min(max(0, Nit-Hit), Lit)) 
3.1 The 2-stage case 
In a 2-stage game (k=2), stage 1 is the initial stage in which 
customer can purchase reserved service, and stage 2 is the final 
stage in which customers can decide what type of jobs go to what 
type of service. We analyze such a game backwards. 
Assuming the customer i has purchased reserved service at stage 1. 
In stage 2 there are 3 possible conditions with respect to the 
relationship between ni2 and Ni2, and in each condition, the customer’s best choice on xi2 is determined as given: 
       
                                                     
Then expected xi2 is:                                         
     
    
Here Ni2=Ni1-Hi1-xi1. The customer’s best choice of xi2 is a 
function of xi1. It is not surprising that customers facing more high 
value jobs (a bigger a) tend to use less reserved resource to 
execute low value jobs. 
Given the distribution of ni2 and utility structure of customer i, he 
can decide an optimal number of reserved hours for VH jobs. Since 
stage 2 is the final stage, job arrivals at stage 2 could be 
considered equivalent to the dynamic demand modeled in a single 
selling season in the newsvendor model [13]. Therefore the 
optimal number of reserved instance for future VH jobs, which will 
be kept from executing any type of job, is:                     
In stage 1, the customer receives ni1 job. He has to choose an 
optimal xi1. When          , this customer will set xi1=0. 
When          , he solves the problem below to get optimal 
value of xi1.                                       
Subject to:                       
Note Hi1=ani1. The problem is equivalent to maximize            subject to the upper bound of          . Although        decreases in xi1, it’s not clear how the combination moves 
with xi1. We use a numerical example to illustrate how the best xi1 
looks like. Parameter setting is as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Parameters of numerical illustration of xi1 
Variable T N VH λ n1 
Value 69 200 0.8 160 155 
 
The parameters are set subject to the two constraints: 1)       
and 2)     ; . We vary the value of a. Results are shown in 
following figures (Figure 1a ~ 1d). 
 
 
Figure 1a. a=0.2 
 
Figure 1b. a=0.25 
 
Figure 1c. a=0.3 
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 Figure 1d. a=0.32 
The horizontal dotted line in these figures represents        . As a increases, xi1 decreases. The customer has to “hold” 
more reserved resources for high value jobs in stage 1 when he is 
planning the stage 2 usage. The numerical examples show us that 
xi1 is much smaller than xi2. The behavior is consistent with our 
observations in lemma 2 that as the proportion of VH jobs 
increases, customers are more likely to submit VL jobs to reserved 
service only in stage 2. 
Figure 1c and 1d demonstrate a different shape of curve, 
compared to Figures 1a and 1b. We see the curve of xi1+E(xi2) has 
fast raising in both ends, but a flat line in the middle. In addition, 
we observe through a large scale of numerical examples 5  that 
when VH is getting close to VL, the middle flat line moves upwards 
and two rising ends stay invariant. In addition, as VH is getting 
closer to VL, the optimal value of xi1 will increase as well. It 
implies that when the difference between high value jobs and low 
value jobs diminishes, customers are less likely to hold “space” in 
reserve service for future high-value job arrivals. Rather, they 
tend to submit current demand (both high and low value jobs) to 
reserve instances.  
 
3.2 The k-stage case 
The analysis for 2-stage game shows that customers tend to hold a 
certain amount of reserved resource in earlier stages to make sure 
there are sufficient reserved instance hours for the future VH jobs. 
Now consider the k-stage case. Customers have the similar 
concern as that in the 2-stage game. Customers have to consider to 
issues. First, how many reserved instance hours to be kept for 
future VH jobs, and second, how many VL jobs to submit to the 
reserved instance at the current stage.  
The logic behind the considerations is that if current stock of 
reserved resource significantly exceeds optimal the stock level for 
future VH jobs, some of the reserved resource will likely be wasted 
if a customer takes a too conservative strategy in submitting VL 
jobs to reserved service. On the other hand, if a customer is too 
aggressive in submitting VL jobs to reserved service, he faces the 
risk of running out of reserved resource before the last batch of VH 
jobs arrive. 
Each customer’s job arrival process is independent and identical 
among k stages. In this case, multiple i.i.d Poisson arrival 
processes can be combined as a single Poisson arrival. Thus for 
customer i in stage t, the number of its total future jobs, in the rest 
of k-t stages, denoted by      , follows a Poisson distribution with 
the arrival rate (k-t)λi.  
                                                                
5
 Due to the length limit, results from these large set of numerical 
examples are not provided here, but they are available upon request.  
Similar to the 2-stage case, at any stage t, the customer i can 
foresee three conditions regarding      . 
(1).               
(2).                   
(3).              
Here Nit+1=Nit-Rit=Nit-Hit-xit.  
We can assume a virtual stage    as the combination of the rest k-t 
stages. We simulated 5 stages Poisson arrival processes with 
arrival rate 100 and one single stage Poisson arrival process with 
arrival rate 500. Each has 500 traces. A paired t-test shows there is 
no difference between the two series generated by these methods. 
Therefore at stage t, a customer faces similar problem as that in 
stage 1 of the 2-stage game. However it has to keep different 
amount of reserved instance hours for future high value jobs based 
on how many stages there are in the virtual stage. That is to say, in 
a single stage, the best decision is to keep   reserved instance 
hours for VH jobs that are to be realized, and                . In 
this virtual stage   , the customer will need to keep                        reserved instance hours. 
So far we can summarize a customer’s best decision rule at any 
stage t: 
(1) Submit Ht high value jobs to reserved service. 
(2) Calculate     using the above formula. 
(3) If          , the customer should not submit any VL job to 
reserved service. Otherwise he will choose the optimal xt that 
solves the problem:                                    
Subject to:                      
And here                                                         
    
                                         
The formulas are similar to those in the 2-stage game, except that 
the stage 2 is replaced by the our virtual stage   , which makes the 
calculations conducted in different scales. The process is repeated 
until the end of stage k. So we can conclude that a k-stage game is 
to repeat the 2-stage game (k-1) times.  
 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
We model a multi-stage game with a monopolistic Cloud service 
provider who offers both reserved service and interruptible spot 
service. Reserved service is quality-guaranteed, and must be 
purchased at the beginning by a fixed price. Spot service is 
interruptible by the provider; and the price for spot service is 
adjusted dynamically over time. Customers receive two types of 
job arrivals, high value and low value jobs. They must decide (1) 
whether to purchase the quality-guaranteed reserve price at the 
268
first stage; (2) in each stage, how many jobs to submit to reserve 
service and how many to submit to spot service.   
To analyze this decision-making problem, we first study the 
equilibrium market segmentation. We define the customer who is 
indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing reserved 
service at the first stage. Only those with higher demand than this 
indifferent customer, in terms of the expected number of job 
arrivals, will purchase reserved price service. Furthermore, these 
customers could be categorized into two groups, those who will 
submit jobs to both reserved service and spot service and those 
who will only use reserved service. Together with the customers 
who won’t purchase reserved service initially (and hence they 
only use spot service), we get a three-segment customer 
population. Numerical results show that the proportion of high 
value jobs is a major factor influencing the market segmentation. 
When this proportion increases, i.e., a higher value of a, the 
segment of customers purchasing reserve service enlarges; for 
those who use both types of services, they are more likely to 
submit high value jobs to spot service.  
In a 2-stage game setting, we demonstrate how customers should 
optimally choose stock level of reserved resources and make the 
optimal decision on how many low value jobs to be executed on 
reserved instances. In a k-stage case, we make use of virtual stage 
to represent all future job arrivals and shape customers’ decision 
problem. We prove that customers’ behavior is similar to that in 
the 2-stage case; and the solution could also be derived the same 
way as that in the 2-stage game. 
We plan to extend our work in the following two directions. We 
first need investigate the decision problem of Cloud provider. So 
far, we have studied customers’ strategic behavior. To us, an 
equally and even more important research question is that given 
customers’ response, how shall the Cloud provider set the price 
and quality limit for his reserved instances? How could these 
decision choices (both p and N in our model) respond to the 
changes in market conditions, such as customers’ job arrival rate, 
the proportion of high-value job, and/or the job value variation? 
Secondly, we need use simulations to test our findings for a larger 
set of parameter values. We expect to discover systematic 
relationships between the model outcomes and some key 
parameters.  
Our analysis has some limitations. For example, we assume the 
job arrival process of a customer during all stages is identical and 
independent, following a Poisson distribution. But in reality the 
job arrival processes in different stages could be very different 
and highly related. In addition, in this study, we the spot price ps 
and service interruption probability pt as exogenously given. 
However, a profit-maximizing Cloud provider in practice should 
be able to collect user’s bid (for spot instance) and set spot price 
optimally. Such a decision-making of providers is not in our 
considerations.  
 
5. REFERENCES 
[1] Amazon. 2009. Announcing Amazon EC2 Spot Instances. 
Accessible at http://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-
new/2009/12/14/announcing-amazon-ec2-spot-instances/ 
[2] Amazon. AWS Economics Center. Accessible at 
http://aws.amazon.com/economics/ 
[3] Ben-Yehuda, O.A., Ben-Yehuda, M., Schuster, A., and 
Tsafrir, D. 2011. Deconstructing Amazon EC2 Spot Instance 
Pricing. In Proceedings of the IEEE Third International 
Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science 
(Athens, Greece, November 29 - December 1, 2011). 
CloudCom ’11. IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC, 
USA, 304-311. 
[4] Bhargava, H. K., and Choudhary, V. 2008. Research Note---
When Is Versioning Optimal for Information Goods? 
Manage. Sci. 54, 5 (May. 2008), 1029-1035. 
[5] Etzion, H., Pinker, E., and Seidmann, A. 2006. Analyzing the 
simultaneous use of auctions and posted prices for online 
selling. Manuf. Serv. Op. 8, 1 (Winter 2006), 68–91. 
[6] Fishburn, P.C. , Odlyzko, A.M.,  and Siders, R.C. 1997. 
Fixed fee versus unit pricing for information goods: 
competition, equilibria, and price wars. First Monday. 2, 7 
(July 1997). Also to appear in Internet Publishing and 
Beyond: The Economics of Digital Information and 
Intellectual Property, D. Hurley, B. Kahin, and H. Varian, 
eds. MIT Press.  
[7] Liu, H. 2011. A Measurement Study of Server Utilization in 
Public Clouds. In Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Ninth 
International Conference on Dependable, Autonomic and 
Secure Computing (Sydney, Australia, December 12-14, 
2011). DASC '11. IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC, 
USA, 435-442. DOI=10.1109/DASC.2011.87 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/DASC.2011.87  
[8] Rahman, M. R., Lu, Y., and Gupta, I. 2011. Risk aware 
resource allocation for clouds. Technical Report. University 
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Available at 
http://hdl.handle.net/2142/25754 
[9] Richard, D.S., Huang, J.H., and Yang, Y.P. 2012. Negotiable 
SLAs for Cloud Computing Spot Market: a Myth or a 
Business Opportunity. Working paper. 
[10] SEOMOZ. 2011. Crawl Outage - An Update and What We're 
Doing. Accessible at http://www.seomoz.org/blog/crawl-
outage 
[11] Sridhar, B., Bhattacharya, S., and Krishnan, V. 2009. Pricing 
Information Goods: A Strategic Analysis of the Selling and 
On-demand Pricing Mechanisms. Working paper. 
[12]  Sundararajan, A. 2004. Nonlinear Pricing of Information 
Goods. Manage. Sci. 50, 12 (Dec. 2004), 1660-1673. 
[13] William, J. S. 2009. Operations Management. 10th edition, 
McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 581. 
[14] Yi, S., Kondo, D., and Andrzejak, A. 2010. Reducing costs 
of spot instances via checkpointing in the Amazon Elastic 
Compute Cloud. In Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 3rd 
International Conference on Cloud Computing (Miami, FL, 
USA, July 05-10, 2010). CLOUD ’11. 236-243.  
 
 
 
269
